PPCC-Pisitófilos Creditófagos-Verano 2022

[pianista]

Catacrack sin catacrack
Quizá catacrok sin catacrack o crock sin catacrock ni catacrack,,,
Pero catacrack sin catacrack,,,eso no posible es,,,seamos precisos en el palabrerío

Espérate un poco.

El vaticano ordena a todas las entidades afiliadas que transfieran todos los fondos y activos al Banco del Vaticano (IOR) antes del 30 de septiembre.

https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/it/bollettino/pubblico/2022/08/23/0608/01222.html?s=08

No hay prisa, estoy en liquidez desde 2006 esperando el crock, es decir, el catacrack
Esperando el MFBH/p para comprar banca al sol y participar gozosamente de la próxima burbuja si Dios quiere
Si Basilea III funciona comprar banca al sol puede ser buena idea: BBVAs, BANKINTER serían mis preferidas
Después quizá Mapfre,,,
¿Cómo lo ven?

[Rocoso]

La transición energética avanza a una velocidad considerable:

https://www.worldenergytrade.com/energias-alternativas/energia-solar/fotovoltaica-espana-records-en-2022-16474

La fotovoltaica en España bate récords, en 2022 ya ha producido más energía que en todo 2021

http://revistanuevasenergias.com/2022/09/08/espana-ya-produce-el-triple-de-energia-solar-que-hace-3-anos/

España ya produce el triple de energía solar que hace 3 años

¿Cómo se aprovecha saberlo, considerando que sabemos también que la energía eléctrica está abocada a su deflación?:




¿Cuánto negocio va a ser la financiación de la transición energética para la banca?:




Valoramos mucho sus opiniones al respecto. En cualquier caso, animamos a quienes tengan un conocimiento directo sobre el estado del sector a que se den de alta y participen en estos hilos. Necesitamos nuevas voces.

[JENOFONTE10]

LIQUIDEZ CUANTITATIVA PARA TRANSICIONES PREVISIBLES

En suma, mantengámonos fríos y en rabiosa liquidez. [...] es mejor tener una cartera de valores propia gestionada por uno mismo, porque no nos fiamos de unos gestores de fondos, meros trabajadores-directivos, que solo saben insultar al Estado.

Solo añadiré que liquidez 'rabiosa' no significa 'total', ni cripto-moneda es moneda; siguiendo a Warren, la liquidez total es totalmente improductiva, como el oro en lingotes, y suelen acarrear gastos 'mayores que un epsilon' en seguridad y custodia.

A efectos cuantitativos, criterio prudente de liquidez podría ser el propuesto para coyunturas de 'vacas flacas', según aquel intérprete de sueños faraónicos (Génesis, cap. 37 y ss.): unos 7 años de gastos previsibles; si gustan, pueden añadir alguna cantidad de alimento de larga duración, como higos secos o grano, por si la guerra de Ucrania se alarga.

Saludos.

[asustadísimos]

[Hemos retocado el comentario anterior.]

Vean qué maravilla:
Around The Corner - How Differential Steering Works (1937)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yYAw79386WI

[CHOSEN]

Tremendísimo epílogo.
Mil Gracias.

Todo está clarísimo, únicamente yo aún no veo cómo esta parte:

la imperiosa necesidad que tiene el sistema capitalista de poner los precios inmobiliarios en su sitio, que es bajísimo —porque la extravagancia inmobiliaria la paga con Trabajo & Empresa y Dinero & Capital, y el sistema no va a suicidarse—.

encaja con la inclusión de elementos de planificación central.
y no porque no la vea, sino porque en mi opinión se corre el riesgo de que al sistema capitalista "lo suiciden".

Hace años ya comenté como la sociedad occidental avanzaba con paso firme hacia una economía fascista supranacional -dicho sea sin entrar a valorar las connotaciones morales o históricas del término- pero es que lo que se define aquí es justamente eso. Y se hace en el ámbito de una nueva guerra contra el comunismo -en este caso el chino- y en un entorno postcrisis similar al que hizo medrar los regímenes dirigistas europeos y por supuesto el americano, que tras el 29 fue lo mismo con otro nombre.
Recomiendo a que se lean estos dos extractos con el fin de concoer el pasado para entender el futuro.

https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Econom%C3%ADa_fascista

https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirigismo

Saludos y gracias de nuevo.

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/4c35e65d-acb5-4c0b-97f7-81637051e02f

Investors cool on property groups as tide of cheap money recedes

Rising interest rates and spiralling inflation could be a problem for landlords that piled on debt when rates were low/color]

In March last year, Swedish real estate mogul Roger Akelius spotted challenges ahead for the business he founded three decades ago and decided to take some chips off the table.

Akelius Residential Property had ridden a wave of rising property prices and falling interest rates. Now, the 77-year-old property tycoon presented a simple plan for “safeguarding present profit” to its board: sell assets and repay debt. “We will sell Stockholm, Malmo, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Berlin,” he wrote in an email to board members.

Six months later, the company struck a deal to sell nearly 30,000 apartments across Germany, Denmark and Sweden to rival Swedish property firm Heimstaden Bostad, which took on the equivalent of more than $6bn in new debt to complete a deal worth more than $10bn.

“Heimstaden doubled the size of its portfolio and leveraged up to do it,” said David Shnaps, a senior analyst at research firm CreditSights. “At the time, I was thinking, one of these guys is right and the other isn’t.”

One year on, with rising interest rates and spiralling inflation threatening debt-laden landlords, Akelius appears to have been vindicated.

At the same time, bond investors, who in recent years have lent European property companies more and more money at lower and lower yields, are fretting over these companies. Losses on real estate bonds have outpaced the wider corporate debt market this year.

A high-profile governance scandal at German residential property group Adler has cast a shadow over the sector, and since the European Central Bank ended its bond-buying programme in July, new debt issuance has ground to a halt.

“Such low interest rates are not normal,” Akelius told the Financial Times. “You can almost play with the central banks but you cannot play with the whole market for several years. The nature of the economy will take its revenge.”

Now that the tide of cheap money has gone out, some heavily indebted European property companies risk running aground.



Having accounted for less than 1 per cent of European corporate bonds outstanding in 2012, real estate debt made up nearly 6 per cent of the market by last year, according to analysis from Legal and General Investment Managers.

An undersupply of homes and population growth on the continent encouraged companies to grow by borrowing. Demand for residential property only increased during the coronavirus pandemic, and with cheap debt readily available, real estate investors were willing to buy new properties at historically low rental yields.

As well as rising borrowing costs, landlords also now have higher fuel, material and labour costs. Then there is the all important question of how tenants will cope with rent rises, given the current squeeze on incomes.

Choppy waters

Adler embodied the excesses of the easy credit years. Through a string of debt-fuelled acquisitions, the little-known business transformed itself into a sprawling conglomerate that owned 70,000 apartments across Germany.

In the background was Cevdet Caner, an Austrian property magnate who had presided over Germany’s second-largest real estate bankruptcy at the age of 35. On paper he had a passive role in Adler, having built a stake in the company through his family’s investment foundation, but in Europe’s close-knit real estate industry, it was an open secret that he was heavily involved in the group.

In 2020, a whistleblower told regulators and lenders that Caner was concealing his involvement in Adler through “complicated opaque structures”. Short seller Viceroy Research then published a highly critical report on Adler and its links to Caner in 2021.

A subsequent forensic review of Adler’s accounts by KPMG uncovered extensive evidence that Caner not only had significant involvement in decision making at Adler, but also received payments from the company.



In April this year, the firm refused to sign off on Adler’s accounts and then resigned as its auditor. Adler has yet to find a replacement. Last month, German financial watchdog BaFin found that Adler had overstated its 2019 accounts by up to €233mn.

In response to the KPMG review, Adler’s chair said no “fraud and deception” had been uncovered. Caner said that the report had “rebutted the financially and reputationally damaging allegations by Viceroy”.

But the episode has proved painful for Adler’s bondholders. Some bonds in its more than €7bn debt pile are trading at little over 50 cents on the euro.

It has also been a more general wake-up call for investors.

“Adler’s situation is having some contagion effect, because investors are now reassessing what they thought was safe annuity-type risk — as now a lot riskier,” said Gabriele Foà, a portfolio manager at Algebris.

For some, the problems at Adler are indicative of wider governance issues across the clubby world of European real estate.

In February this year, Viceroy turned its fire on Swedish real estate company Samhallsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden, alleging the “debt-fuelled” residential company had overstated the value of its assets and conflicts of interest on its board. SBB has denied Viceroy’s allegations in press statements.

Some of Viceroy’s criticism centred on the company’s “staggering” debt pile. The short seller calculated SBB’s “loan-to-value” ratio, the industry measure of debt to assets, as almost 70 per cent, if the hybrid bonds it has issued were as debt, rather than equity.

Though this was far above the 46 per cent reported by SBB in the first half of 2022, the company said classing hybrid loans as equity is “not unusual” in real estate. Its bonds have not lost as much value as those issued by Adler.

Steps to clear debt

In Germany, Vonovia — the country’s largest real estate company and Adler’s biggest shareholder — is taking steps to ease pressure on its balance sheet.

As debt markets have cooled, with new corporate bond issuance dropping by 16 per cent in Europe in the first half of 2022, Rolf Buch, Vonovia’s chief executive, told analysts at a recent earnings call that the company would sell off €13bn of assets “as fast as possible” to provide cash.

“Neither new equity, nor new debt are viable options in this market,” said Philip Grosse, Vonovia’s chief financial officer.



Bankers expect other companies to offload property to cut debt to more manageable levels, but while some are stepping back from the market, others are willing to buy.

Heimstaden, the second largest residential real estate company in Europe, spent another €217mn to buy more than 2,000 homes from Finnish company Sato in April.

Heimstaden chief investment officer Christian Fladeland said housing shortages across Europe mean that “fundamentals for residential investments” remain strong.

But investors are less certain. While Akelius Residential’s loan-to-value ratio, the industry measure of debt to assets, now stands at 9 per cent, Heimstaden’s was over 45 per cent in its second-quarter results.

“We are not that positive [on real estate] in the context of rising rates,” said Philippe Dehoux, head of global bonds at asset manager Candriam. “The sector has a lot of debt.”

Foà at Algebris added that he was wary about the property sector. “Real estate has been leveraging up a lot. They are very, very cyclical.”

Companies are not excessively worried about debt repayments yet, however, because few bonds will mature before the end of 2023 and 2024. “What you will need for more worry to kick in is a catalyst,” said one banker. “If ratings agencies pre-emptively move on someone, if someone has a hard time putting up rents or if they are held back by government regulation.”

But as conditions worsen, groups with less access to cash could struggle to refinance debt. “Maybe that leads to consolidation within the sector, with smaller names getting into trouble and being bought up over the next year or two,” said another banker.

Another long-term investor is also not done with hunting out opportunities in European real estate. According to Roger Akelius: “At the end of the crisis, there will be a lot of possibilities to acquire properties in good locations in the next three or four years.”

[AbiertoPorDemolicion]

https://www.ft.com/content/4c35e65d-acb5-4c0b-97f7-81637051e02f

Investors cool on property groups as tide of cheap money recedes

Rising interest rates and spiralling inflation could be a problem for landlords that piled on debt when rates were low/color]

[...]

Heimstaden chief investment officer Christian Fladeland said housing shortages across Europe mean that “fundamentals for residential investments” remain strong.

Nada, no preocuparse. Los Investors saben que las Clases Medias Propietarias juegan en la misma liga que ellos, y que estos tienen el poder político suficiente para llevar el mercao a donde ellos les interese, como siempre han hecho, ya sea implantando una ideología socialsta o neoliberal (o dirigista como algunos han sacado por aquí). A ellos les da igual que el gato sea blanco o negro, siempre que caze ratones.

La pata del Cheap Money se les ha caído, pero todavía tienen el control político sobre la oferta, y como la gente en algún sitio tiene que vivir, otra de las patas en la que se sujeta el popularcapitalismo, saben que todavía les quedan bastantes años de extraer rentas.

"Heimstaden chief investment officer Christian Fladeland said housing shortages across Europe mean that “fundamentals for residential investments” remain strong."

Shortages, quédense con esta palabra que va a ser de las más oídas en los papers del popularcapitalismo.

[Derby]

https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/real-estate-booms-are-behind-europes-productivity-divergence

Real estate booms are behind Europe’s productivity divergence

The lack of real convergence between countries in Europe is a major obstacle to the proper functioning of the euro area. This column investigates the role of sectoral reallocations in the divergence of productivity between countries and shows that variations in the relative size of sectors have encouraged diverging productivity dynamics. Because real estate shocks drive sectoral reallocations – directly feeding the productivity divergence between countries – policies aiming to promote convergence in Europe should focus not only on supply-side policies but also on the effects of diverging national demand shocks.

The creation of the euro in 1999 was expected to become a catalyst for real convergence in Europe. Instead, real divergence increased as evidenced by low productivity growth in the ‘periphery’ of the euro area relative to ‘core’ countries. This divergence was accompanied by massive capital flows from the euro area’s core ­– Germany, the Netherlands – to its periphery, (e.g. Portugal or Spain). The process left peripheral economies with financial and real estate bubbles – Spain being emblematic of the latter – together with a continuously weakening manufacturing sector while this same sector gained strength in Germany (Krugman 2013).

Figure 1 provides a striking illustration of the divergence process at work in the euro area since the beginning of the 21stcentury. It focuses on three countries emblematic of structural divergences within the euro area: Germany and Spain, for the previously mentioned reasons, as well as France, which is often described as occupying an ‘in-between’ position. Between 2000 and 2015, Spanish total factor productivity (TFP) stagnated, while French TFP increased at half the pace of German TFP.



Note: This figure uses EU KLEMS data and measures TFP as a weighted average of sectoral TFP based on a classification with 33 sectors. Country-level TFP (in log, with value set to 0 in 2000) built using historical value-added shares by sector as weights. DE: Germany, ES: Spain, FR: France

Parallel to this real divergence, European countries experienced heterogeneous real estate price dynamics which took the form, in some economies, of massive boom-bust cycles. These real estate booms occurred notably in Spain and France, while price increases were more moderate in Germany, particularly in the first decade of the sample (Figure 2). This column argues that real estate prices contributed to both the productivity divergence and the slowdown in the EU through a sectoral reallocation mechanism.

Figure 2 Real estate prices



Note: Country-level real estate prices (index, with value set to 100 in 2000). DE: Germany, ES: Spain, FR: France.

The key role of sectoral reallocations in productivity dynamics

A recent literature studies the role of resource misallocations in explaining international differences in productivity by focusing on within-sector reallocations among firms (see e.g. Bartelsman et al. 2013, Banerjee and Coricelli 2017, García-Santana et al. 2020). However, in recent research (Grjebine et al. 2022), we show that reallocation between sectors is a strong candidate in explaining both the productivity slowdown observed in most EU countries and the divergence between them.

Based on a database of 33 sectors and 14 countries between 1995 and 2015, Figure 3 compares the actually observed TFP to a counterfactual aggregate TFP, based on a weighted sum of sectoral TFP for which the share in value-added for each sector has been set to its 2000 level. In Spain, the TFP dynamics would not have been negative without these reallocations. In France, the difference between the cumulative growth of TFP for the initial sectoral structure and the observed growth of TFP is around 2%. This disparity means that without sectoral reallocations, growth in TFP could have doubled. The gap in cumulative TFP growth between France and Germany would also have been reduced from about 1.5 percentage points to 0.5 points. The right panel shows the difference between the plain and the dashed lines for each of the three considered countries, revealing the extent of the divergences in TFP dynamics fuelled by sectoral reallocations: whereas losses have been limited in Germany, they have been significant in Spain (until a reversal in 2008) and continued increasing in France. We report TFP losses due to sectoral reallocations for the 14 studied European countries. TFP losses due to sectoral reallocations are largest in France, followed closely by Denmark, Finland, and Portugal. Losses are also substantial in the UK, Italy, and Austria.

Figure 3 TFP losses due to sectoral reallocations

(a) TFP vs. TFP without sectoral reallocations



(b) TFP losses due to sectoral reallocations



Note: Panel (a): ‘TFP’ is the country-level TFP (in log, with value set to 0 in 2000) built using historical value-added shares by sector as weights. ‘TFP (initial weights)’ is the country-level TFP using initial value-added shares by sector as weights. Panel (b): ‘TFP losses’ displays the gap between ‘TFP’ and ‘TFP (initial weights)’. DE: Germany, ES: Spain, FR: France.

Figure 4 compares the dynamics of real estate prices with those of TFP. It is striking to see that the dynamics of TFP losses and real estate prices reflect each other closely, and that periods of booming real estate prices generally coincide with sectoral reallocations detrimental to TFP. This clearly suggests a relationship between the two phenomena.

Figure 4 Real estate prices versus TFP losses



Note: Country-level real estate prices (index, with value set to 100 in 2000). ‘TFP losses’ displays the gap between ‘TFP’ and ‘TFP (initial weights)’. ‘TFP’ is the country-level TFP (in log, with value set to 0 in 2000) built using historical value-added shares by sector as weights. ‘TFP (initial weights)’ is the country-level TFP using initial value-added shares by sector as weights.

Real estate shocks as a trigger for sectoral reallocations

In this regard, real estate shocks lead to reallocations involving all sectors of the economy, and not only towards construction, thus transforming the structure of the economy. More specifically, we use variations in (real estate) collateral at the country-sector level to identify the impact of real estate shocks on sectoral reallocations. The collateral mechanism is linked to the ‘financial accelerator’ (Bernanke and Gertler 1989, Kiyotaki and Moore 1997): with imperfect financial markets, financially constrained sectors (and firms within these sectors) will use their pledgeable assets as collateral to finance their investment (Chaney et al. 2012). Consistently, we expect that an increase in the value of the collateral will allow sectors to increase their investment, the more so if the sector has relatively more collateral (which we measure through the amount of real estate capital owned by the sector).

More specifically, we identify exogenous shocks to domestic real estate prices through a combination of world demand shocks and country-level supply constraints on the real estate market. This allows us to recover the causal impact of real estate price shocks on investment, share of total value added (as a proxy for sectoral size), and TFP growth at the country-sector level. Our results show that exogenous real estate price shocks increase sectoral investment and size: a 10-percentage point increase of real estate sectoral holdings brings an additional 0.8 percentage points in the ratio of investment to capital stock, and an additional 6 percentage points to the ratio of gross value added to capital stock. Conversely, we find no significant impact on sectoral TFP. Put differently, real estate shocks may affect aggregate TFP exclusively through a sectoral reallocation mechanism.

Interestingly, we find that these productivity effects of real estate price shocks are not only quantitatively non-negligible but also point to a greater divergence between EU countries. On the one hand, there is a group of countries where real estate shocks generate TFP losses, including countries where real estate booms started early and were substantial, such as Ireland, the UK, France, and Spain. On the other hand, there is another group of countries for which our mechanism generates TFP gains – including Germany, Austria, and Italy, where real estate prices grew later or at a slower pace. These results fit well with recent work by Hau and Ouyang (2018), whose data for the Chinese manufacturing sector demonstrate that real estate booms exert a detrimental effect on other industries through the diversion of local savings into the real estate sector.

Policy implications

The lack of real convergence between countries is a major obstacle to the proper functioning of the euro area. This column highlights the importance of a sectoral specialisation mechanism triggered by real estate cycles in feeding this lack of real convergence. This explains Spain’s lag behind Germany before the Great Recession, and partly explains France’s lag afterwards. In this regard, real estate shocks not only lead to reallocations towards the construction sector, but also change the relative size of every sector and consequently the whole structure of economies.

In this work, we remain relatively agnostic about fundamental shocks that drive real estate prices. Diverging financial or housing cycles – in particular between France and Spain on the one hand and Germany on the other – could be due to diverging demand shocks at the national level such as diverging fiscal policies. From a policy perspective, institutions that want to promote the convergence of productivity in Europe should thus not only focus on supply-side policies but should also take into account the effects of diverging national demand shocks on the European productivity divergence.

*TFP=Total Factor Productivity

[Rocoso]

Me respondo a mí mismo acerca del negocio bancario de la transición energética española (TErE)

1. Como pueden leer en el enlace, el Plan Nacional Integrado de Energía y Clima (PNIEC), preveía en 2019 una inversión de 92.589 millones de euros para añadir una potencia eléctrica de 55 GW de nuevas renovables, en un periodo de diez años, hasta 2030.

https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/el-coste-medio-por-cada-nuevo-megavatio-de-renovable-ascendera-a-168-millones-hasta-2030-la-fv-la-mas-barata-termosolar-y-bombeo-las-mas-caras/


Supongamos que la revisión del Plan, que estos días se ha abierto a consultas ( https://www.eldiario.es/economia/gobierno-revisara-alza-objetivos-renovables-plena-crisis-energetica_1_9267146.html) y que persigue objetivos más ambiciosos, no sólo por la guerra en Ucrania, sino también por la constatación de que los ritmos de instalación están siendo mucho más rápidos de lo previsto, fija un aumento del 20%. Eso nos da, 111.107 millones de euros, para 66GW.

2. Añadamos inversiones en hidrógeno verde, necesarias para dar continuidad, ante el aumento de intermitencia total de un sistema de generación en el que las renovables alcanzarán el 85% de la generación eléctrica total (con el Plan actual es el 74 %)

https://www.csic.es/es/actualidad-del-csic/el-hidrogeno-verde-un-acumulador-energetico-para-catapultar-las-renovables

En este documento de 2020, se da la cifra de 8.900 millones de euros para ello:

https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2020/10/Hidrogeno-verde-el-nuevo-vector-energetico.pdf


La aumentamos estimativamente en un 40% (Dudosamente será suficiente, no obstante, para resolver todos los problemas de intermitencia del futuro sistema). Por tanto, 12.460 millones.


3. Si sumamos los dos grupos de inversiones anteriores, nos da un total de 123.567 millones de euros. En la financiación de proyectos de este tipo, la ratio de capitalización se mueve en la horquilla del 15 al 20%. Asumamos la hipótesis más agresiva, el 15%

Obtenemos, entonces, que el valor total de las operaciones bancarias de activo que el sistema financiero español podrá incorporar al balance de sus entidades es de 105.032 millones de euros.

No es una cifra que exprese un volumen de negocio bancario comparable al inmobiliario de la segunda alza explosiva de la burbuja. Consideremos, el periodo 2000-2010. Recordemos que, entonces, en el momento de nuestro particular crack, hacia 2010, sólo el saldo vivo del crédito promotor-constructor estaba en 200.000 millones de euros (como mínimo), más 100.000 millones por los préstamos ya pagados durante ese decenio, son 300.000 millones; el de los préstamos hipotecarios para la adquisición de vivienda por particulares en unos 600.000 millones de euros. Unos 900.000 millones de euros en total. La inflación (medida con el criterio del IPC) acumulada desde entonces (excluyendo la de 2022) es de un 21%, así que, en euros de 2022, el negocio de la financiación bancaria de la actividad inmobiliaria española fue de 1.089.000 millones de euros (no me acostumbro a la monstruosidad de la cifra). Redondeemos, 1,1 billones de euros.

Los 105.032 millones para el negocio bancario de la transición energética española 2020-2030, frente a los 1.100.000 millones del negocio inmobiliario-bancario español en el decenio 2000-2010, son poquita cosa (10x), si consideramos la cuestión desde el punto de vista de nuestra estructura económica. Pero, desde la perspectiva de su posible repercusión en el rendimiento en Bolsa de las acciones de nuestros bancos, la comparación apropiada no es esa.

Veamos. De los 1.100.000 millones destinados a operaciones inmobiliarias por nuestras entidades de crédito, sólo una parte menor estaba en el balance de nuestros bancos. En 2010, las cajas de ahorro eran la mayor parte de nuestro sistema crediticio y, además, tomaron una cuota mayor en la financiación inmobiliaria que los bancos. Nunca se publicó el dato completo (que yo sepa); supongamos que un 65% de esas operaciones eran de las cajas (no puede estar muy lejos del dato real). En ese caso, sólo 385.000 millones fueron de operaciones ejecutadas por bancos cotizados. Sigue siendo un negocio bancario mucho más grande que el de la transición energética.

No obstante, en el periodo 2010-2020, el negocio inmobiliario se convirtió en el “monocultivo”  del sector financiero español; en el modelo del negocio bancario 2020-2030, el inmobiliario no desaparece, sino que se ajusta a sus equilibrios a largo plazo. Supongamos que los precios medios a los que se va a financiar el sector son un 50% de los actuales, como prevé Asustadísimos, (simplifiquemos a la baja asumiendo su homogeneidad para todo el periodo), tengamos además, en cuenta, que el precio medio del metro cuadrado en España, está hoy en 1.896 € metro cuadrado, según Idealista, cifra que, además, no parecen muy distante de la media del periodo 2000-2010. Supongamos también que el volumen de operaciones, por razones demográficas y demás, es del 40% de la de esos años. Aplicando esos porcentajes a la cifra total del operaciones inmobiliarias en 2010, salen 330.000 millones (aquí, desgraciadamente, no podemos estimar qué parte de los 600 millardos en financiación a la compra de vivienda final procedía de operaciones anteriores al año 2000).

Ahora casi todo el sistema de crédito español, está constituido por grupos con su matriz cotizada en Bolsa. Así que sumados íntegramente a los 105.032 millones de la financiación a la TErE, resultan 435.032 millones de euros de operaciones a reflejar en el Activo de su balance. 50.000 millones más que en el periodo anterior.

Volumen de negocio va a haber. La cuestión está en cómo extraer rentabilidad a las operaciones de activo en un periodo que, aceptando una vuelta a la deflación en menos de dos años, de nuevo, va a estar dominado por tipos de interés negativos o cercanos al 0.

Encantado de corregir todos los errores de mis torpes cálculos al volapié.

[Derby]

https://www.directoalpaladar.com/actualidad-1/asi-cesta-30-productos-basicos-carrefour-a-30-euros-suavizante-refresco-cola-galletas-alimento-fresco

Así es la cesta de 30 “productos básicos” de Carrefour a 30 euros: suavizante, refresco de cola, galletas y ni un alimento fresco

La cadena de supermercados Carrefour, segunda por cuota de mercado en España, anunció ayer el lanzamiento de una nueva promoción que consiste en una cesta básica de 30 productos por 30 euros, tanto de alimentación, como de droguería.

La iniciativa, explica el director ejecutivo de Carrefour España Alexandre de Palmas, pretende “ofrecer soluciones de ahorro que protejan el poder adquisitivo de las familias en España”, cogiendo así el guante que lanzaba esta semana la vicepresidenta segunda del Gobierno Yolanda Díaz, que pedía limitar el precio de los productos básicos para aliviar la inflación.

Aunque la promoción no comienza oficialmente hasta este lunes 12 de septiembre, la cesta de productos básicos está ya disponible a modo de prueba piloto en el Hipermercado que Carrefour tiene en Tres Cantos (Madrid) y allí nos hemos desplazado para ver en qué consiste.(...)

Esto entiende Carrefour por “productos básicos”

Lo primero que salta a la vista es que la cesta no incluye ningún producto fresco, algo que ya anticipaba el comunicado compartido por la compañía, y que resulta en cierta medida lógico dada la volatilidad actual de estos productos.

Pero lo que resulta más extraño es encontrar productos de limpieza como suavizantes o bastoncillos para los oídos y una selección de alimentación en la que priman los hidratos de carbono y algún producto que nadie considería básico, como el chocolate blanco o el refresco de cola zero.

Respecto al ahorro que hacemos comprando esta cesta, si compramos todos los productos por separado nos saldría a 46,54 euros. Es decir, ahorraríamos 16,54 €, que es prácticamente lo que cuestan los pañales (14,25€), de largo el producto más caro de la selección y el único que no es de marca blanca.

“Parece que han cogido productos de forma aleatoria”, explica la profesional de la industria alimentaria Gemma del Caño que, tras pensar que la promoción podría ser interesante, ha quedado muy decepcionada. “No es que solo sea un plan de marketing, es que es un mal plan de marketing”.

“En algún momento los supermercados deberían empezar a pensar que el consumidor no es otra persona, no es alguien de fuera, si no que son sus propias familias”, prosigue Del Caño“. Me gustaría que sus propias familias analizaran los productos que se han puesto aquí”.

“Cuando pensé en esta iniciativa pensé en los packs de los bancos de alimentos”, apunta la especialista. “Obviando que los productos frescos están a precios imposibles, que al menos se adaptara a las necesidades generales de la gente, y esto es lo más alejado a las necesidades de la gente. No necesitamos pan de molde y además pan de hamburguesas, necesitamos meterle algo dentro. Estoy disgustada porque no pensé que iba a ser algo tan desastroso”. (...)

Quedamos a la espera de las mejores, pero, por el momento, la cesta que se puede comprar ya en Tres Cantos está compuesta por estos 30 productos. Incluimos, además, su precio por unidad, en el propio Carrefour, fuera de la oferta:

Bastoncillos (0,68 €)
Compresas (0,80 €)
Gel de baño frutal (0,95€)
Pañales Drynites pijama pants Jumbo pack (14,25€)
Papel higiénico dos capas, 12 rollos (1,79€)
Lejía con detergente azul, 2 litros (0,99€)
Lavavajillas frescor limón 1,3 litros (0,85€)
Suavizante concentrado azul 2 litros (1,69€)
Cafe molido natural 250 g (1,35€)
Chocolate blanco 100 g (0,55€)
Mermelada de melocotón 330 g (0,69€)
Corn flakes 500 g (1,09€)
Galletas María Dorada 800 g (1,69€)
Pan de molde 460 g (0,85€)
Pan de hamburguesa Maxi 300 g (0,90€)
Copos de avena 500 g (0,65€)
Refresco de cola zero 6x33cl (1,74€)
Té sabor limón 1,5L (0,71)
Sal fina refinada 1 kg (0,25€)
Atún en aceite de girasol (1,89€)
Espárragos cortos blancos 110 g (1,55€)
Espirales de pasta tricolor 500 g (0,88€)
Albóndigas con salsa de tomate precocinadas 300 g (2,75€)
Harina de trigo 1 kg (0,72€)
Maíz dulce 300 g (0,75€)
Guisantes finos 250 g (0,63€)
Champiñones laminados 230 g (1,06€)
Vinagre de vino blanco 1 L (0,55€)
Caldo de pollo 1 L (0,75€)
Aceite de girasol 1 L (2,54€)

[puede ser]

(...)
Pero lo que resulta más extraño es encontrar productos de limpieza como suavizantes o bastoncillos para los oídos
(...)

¿Los bastoncillos para los oídos no los había prohibido la UE?, igual quieren quitarse de en medio el stock... Qué chusco es todo, y es de una torpeza infinita que Yolanda Díaz sea asociada a las grandes cadenas de supermercados en detrimento del pequeño comercio.
Igual para SUMAR de verdad van a tener que meterla directamente en el PSOE... El giro antiwoke (anti-Podemos) ya lo está dando El País claramente...

[Rocoso]

Ana-Iris Simón, contundente: "La culpa de que no me pueda comprar una casa no es de la generación 'boomer', sino del capitalismo financiero"

La periodista Ana-Iris Simón criticó en laSexta Columna que "lo que está equivocado es un sistema que aboca a miles de jóvenes a compartir piso sin ellos quererlo, a querer tener familia y no poder hacerlo".

https://www.lasexta.com/programas/sexta-columna/anairis-simon-contundente-culpa-que-pueda-comprar-casa-generacion-boomer-sino-capitalismo-financiero_20220910631c7c0560c19f000191a9ab.html

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/4d38e508-6b0a-4074-8978-3feca795a90f

France sends power alert to UK and Spain after trading error

Neighbouring countries receive emergency electricity request from grid operator RTE

France sent an emergency power alert to neighbours including the UK and Spain this week, asking them to be ready to send as much electricity as possible after a huge trading error jeopardised French supplies.

The request was triggered by a trading error by one of France’s regional energy providers, which accidentally oversold huge amounts of electricity over a two-day period.

The unusual alert added to Europe-wide energy stresses as the region faces its worst power crisis in decades owing to soaring costs driven by Russia’s cutting of gas flows.

It also underlined severe strains in France’s power network, which is struggling with an unprecedented number of outages at its nuclear reactors — the linchpin of its generation system.

French grid operator RTE said it on Tuesday sent the call for neighbouring countries to prepare to export more power overnight. The UK’s National Grid and a person close to Spain’s power network confirmed that their countries received the alert.

Électricité de Strasbourg — which provides electricity to the area around the eastern French city and is majority-owned by state-backed utility EDF — said in a statement that it was investigating the “dysfunction”. 

It said it had erroneously sold 2.03 gigawatts and 5.75GW of electricity in two separate transactions on September 6 and 7, and later added that the incident had cost it €60mn after it rebalanced its supply needs. Filings with RTE describe the issue as an IT incident.

Such requests for emergency help are rare. According to energy companies and grid officials, network operators typically send no more than a few per year, acting when they see a risk of supply falling short of demand.

Energy companies are, however, nervous about potential disruptions to intra-European electricity and gas trading if the region is hit by shortages this winter.

The French alert was sent after rebalancing operations at the end of the day showed that there could be a deficit of electricity at Électricité de Strasbourg, a person familiar with the matter said. EDF declined to comment.

Alerts are sent via the European Awareness System — which grid managers use to exchange information — and are used to ensure supplies from elsewhere can be mobilised. In this week’s French case, the extra supplies were ultimately not needed, RTE said.

Energy providers continuously enter into trades to match up supplies with demand. But the amounts at stake are abnormally large — one gigawatt alone is equivalent to the capacity of some nuclear reactors, or enough to power a small city for about a year. 

France was already turning to neighbours to provide extra electricity on a regular basis owing to its reduced nuclear supply, notably the UK — which has been a net exporter of electricity via subsea cables — as well as Germany and Spain.

But at the same time Paris is at loggerheads with Berlin and Madrid over a proposed new gas pipeline from Spain to France.

Olaf Scholz, German chancellor, and Pedro Sánchez, Spain’s prime minister, back the MidCat pipeline, arguing it would help ease energy shortages beyond the Iberian peninsula.

But Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, is opposed to the project, saying existing gas connections between France and Spain are not being used at full capacity. A pipeline that would take several years to complete would not remedy short-term strains and would push Europe further into a dependence on fossil fuels, he added.

“I don’t understand the short-term problem we’re trying to resolve [with this],” Macron said.

The French government is upping the pressure on the operator of its nuclear power fleet, EDF, to fix outages by the winter, after unexpected corrosion problems in some reactors added to scheduled maintenance stoppages and have plunged output to multi-decade lows.

At a meeting on Friday to address the gas price crisis, EU energy ministers in Brussels signalled their support for a temporary cap on the price of gas imports including those from Russia and a windfall levy on energy producers.

[Benzino Napaloni]

(...)
Pero lo que resulta más extraño es encontrar productos de limpieza como suavizantes o bastoncillos para los oídos
(...)

¿Los bastoncillos para los oídos no los había prohibido la UE?, igual quieren quitarse de en medio el stock... Qué chusco es todo, y es de una torpeza infinita que Yolanda Díaz sea asociada a las grandes cadenas de supermercados en detrimento del pequeño comercio.
Igual para SUMAR de verdad van a tener que meterla directamente en el PSOE... El giro antiwoke (anti-Podemos) ya lo está dando El País claramente...

No el bastoncillo en sí sino el material. El palo ya no es de plástico sino de material biode(sa)gradable.

[pollo]

Ana-Iris Simón, contundente: "La culpa de que no me pueda comprar una casa no es de la generación 'boomer', sino del capitalismo financiero"

La periodista Ana-Iris Simón criticó en laSexta Columna que "lo que está equivocado es un sistema que aboca a miles de jóvenes a compartir piso sin ellos quererlo, a querer tener familia y no poder hacerlo".

https://www.lasexta.com/programas/sexta-columna/anairis-simon-contundente-culpa-que-pueda-comprar-casa-generacion-boomer-sino-capitalismo-financiero_20220910631c7c0560c19f000191a9ab.html

¿Dónde está la bolitaaa?

No preste atención al hombre tras la cortina.