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Whether Germany decides to lead or leave [the eurozone], either alternative would be better than to persist on the current course. The difficulty is in convincing Germany that its current policies are leading to a prolonged depression, political and social conflicts, and an eventual breakup not only of the euro but also of the European Union. How to persuade Germany to choose between either accepting the responsibilities and liabilities that a benevolent hegemon should be willing to incur or leaving the euro in the hands of debtor countries that would be much better off on their own? That is the question I shall try to answer
The Way OutGermany must decide whether to become a benevolent hegemon or leave the euro. The first alternative would be by far the best. What would that entail? Simply put, it would require two new objectives that are at variance with current policies:1. Establishing a more or less level playing field between debtor and creditor countries, which would mean that they would be able to refinance their government debt on more or less equal terms.2. Aiming at nominal growth of up to 5 percent so that Europe can grow its way out of its excessive debt burden. This will necessitate a higher level of inflation than the Bundesbank is likely to countenance. It may also require a treaty change and a change in the German constitution.Both these objectives are attainable, but only after considerable progress toward a political union. The political decisions taken in the next year or so will determine the future of the European Union. The steps taken by the ECB on September 6 could be a prelude to the creation of a two-tier Europe; alternatively they could lead to the formation of a closer political union in which Germany accepts the obligations that its leadership position brings with it.A two-tier eurozone would eventually destroy the European Union because the disenfranchised would sooner or later withdraw from it. If a political union is not attainable the next best thing would be an orderly separation between creditor and debtor countries. If the members of the euro cannot live together without pushing their union into a lasting depression, they would be better off separating by mutual consent.In an amicable breakup of the euro it matters a great deal which party leaves, because all the accumulated debts are denominated in a common currency. If a debtor country leaves, its debt increases in value in line with the depreciation of its currency. The country concerned could become competitive; but it would be forced to default on its debt and that would cause incalculable financial disruptions. The common market and the European Union may be able to cope with the default of a small country such as Greece, especially when it is so widely anticipated, but it could not survive the departure of a larger country like Spain or Italy. Even a Greek default may prove fatal. It would encourage capital flight and embolden financial markets to mount bear raids against other countries, so the euro may well break up as the Exchange Rate Mechanism did in 1992.By contrast, if Germany were to exit and leave the common currency in the hands of the debtor countries, the euro would fall and the accumulated debt would depreciate in line with the currency. Practically all the currently intractable problems would dissolve. The debtor countries would regain competitiveness; their debt would diminish in real terms and, with the ECB in their control, the threat of default would evaporate. Without Germany, the euro area would have no difficulty in carrying out the U-turn for which it would otherwise need Chancellor Merkel’s consent.To be specific, the shrunken euro area could establish its own fiscal authority and implement its own Debt Reduction Fund along the lines I shall describe below. Indeed, the shrunken euro area could go much further and convert the entire debt of member countires into eurobonds, not only the excess over 60 percent of GDP. When the exchange rate on the shrunken euro stabilized, risk premiums on eurobonds would fall to levels comparable to those attached to bonds issued in other freely floating currencies, such as the British pound or Japanese yen. This may sound unbelievable; but that is only because the misconceptions that have caused the crisis are so widely believed. It may come as a surprise, but the eurozone, even without Germany, would score better on standard indicators of fiscal solvency than Britain, Japan, or the US.3A German exit would be a disruptive but manageable onetime event, instead of the chaotic and protracted domino effect of one debtor country after another being forced out of the euro by speculation and capital flight. There would be no valid lawsuits from aggrieved bond holders. Even the real estate problems would become more manageable. With a significant exchange rate differential, Germans would be flocking to buy Spanish and Irish real estate. After the initial disruptions the euro area would swing from depression to growth.The common market would survive but the relative position of Germany and other creditor countries that may leave the euro would swing from the winning to the losing side. They would encounter stiff competition in their home markets from the euro area and while they may not lose their export markets, these would become less lucrative. They would also suffer financial losses on their ownership of assets denominated in the euro as well as on their claims within the TARGET2 clearing system. The extent of the losses would depend on the extent of the euro’s depreciation.4Thus they would have a vital interest in keeping the depreciation within bounds. Of course there would be many transitional difficulties, but the eventual result would be the fulfillment of Keynes’s aspiration for a currency system in which the creditors and debtors would both have a vital interest in maintaining stability.After the initial shock, Europe would escape from the deflationary debt trap in which it is currently caught; the global economy in general and Europe in particular would recover and Germany, after it has adjusted to its losses, could resume its position as a leading producer and exporter of high-value-added products. Germany would benefit from the overall improvement. Nevertheless the immediate financial losses and the reversal of its relative position within the common market would be so large that it would be unrealistic to expect Germany to leave the euro voluntarily. The push would have to come from the outside.By contrast, Germany would fare much better if it chooses to behave as a benevolent hegemon and Europe would be spared the upheaval the German withdrawal from the euro would cause. But the path to achieving the dual objectives of a more-or-less level playing field and an effective growth policy would be much more tortuous. I will sketch it out here.The first step would be to establish a European Fiscal Authority (EFA) that would be authorized to make important economic decisions on behalf of member states. This is the missing ingredient that is needed to make the euro a full-fledged currency with a genuine lender of last resort. The fiscal authority acting in partnership with the central bank could do what the ECB cannot do on its own. The mandate of the ECB is to maintain the stability of the currency; it is expressly prohibited from financing government deficits. But there is nothing prohibiting the member states from establishing a fiscal authority. It is Germany’s fear of becoming the deep pocket for Europe that stands in the way.Given the magnitude of Europe’s problems, this is understandable; but it does not justify a permanent division of the euro area into debtors and creditors. The creditors’ interests could and should be protected by giving them veto power over decisions that would affect them disproportionately. That is already recognized in the voting system of the ESM, which requires an 85 percent majority to make important decisions. This feature ought to be incorporated into a new EFA. But when member states contribute proportionately, for instance by providing a certain percentage of their VAT, a simple majority should be sufficient.The EFA would automatically take charge of the EFSF and the ESM. The great advantage of having an EFA is that it would be able to make decisions on a day-to-day basis, like the ECB. Another advantage of the EFA is that it would reestablish the proper distinction between fiscal and monetary responsibilities. For instance, the EFA ought to take the solvency risk on all government bonds purchased by the ECB. There would then be no grounds for objecting to unlimited open-market operations by the ECB. (The ECB may decide to do this on its own on September 6, but only after strenuous objections by the Bundesbank.) Importantly, the EFA would find it much easier than it would be for the ECB to offer public-sector participation in reorganizing the Greek debt. The EFA could express willingness to convert all Greek bonds held by the public sector into zero-coupon bonds starting to mature ten years out, provided Greece reached a primary surplus of, say, 2 percent. This would create a light at the end of the tunnel that could be helpful to Greece even at this late stage.The second step would be to use the EFA to establish a more level playing field than the ECB will be able to offer on its own on September 6. I have proposed that the EFA should establish a Debt Reduction Fund—a modified form of the European Debt Redemption Pact proposed by Chancellor Merkel’s own Council of Economic Advisers and endorsed by the Social Democrats and Greens. The Debt Reduction Fund would acquire national debts in excess of 60 percent of GDP on condition that the countries concerned undertook structural reforms approved by the EFA. The debt would not be canceled but held by the fund. If a debtor country fails to abide by the conditions to which it has agreed the fund would impose an appropriate penalty. As required by the Fiscal Compact, the debtor country would be required to reduce its excess debt by 5 percent a year after a moratorium of five years. That is why Europe must aim at nominal growth of up to 5 percent.The Debt Reduction Fund would finance its bond purchases either through the ECB or by issuing Debt Reduction Bills—a joint obligation of the member countries—and passing on the benefit of cheap financing to the countries concerned. Either way the cost to the debtor country would be reduced to 1 percent or less. The bills would be assigned a zero-risk weighting by the authorities and treated as the highest-quality collateral for repurchase agreements (repos) used in operations at the ECB. The banking system has an urgent need for such a risk-free liquid asset. Banks were holding more than €700 billion of surplus liquidity at the ECB, earning 0.25 percent interest at the time that I proposed this scheme. Since then the ECB reduced the interest rate paid on deposits further, to zero. This assures a large and ready market for the bills at less than 1 percent. By contrast, the plan announced by the ECB on September 6 is unlikely to reduce the cost of financing much below 3 percent.The scheme I proposed was rejected out of hand by the Germans on the grounds that it did not conform to the requirements of the German constitutional court. In my opinion their objection was groundless because the constitutional court ruled against commitments that are unlimited in time and size, while the Debt Reduction Bills would be limited in both directions. If Germany wanted to behave as a benign hegemon it could easily approve such a plan. It could be introduced without any treaty change. Eventually the Debt Reduction Bills could provide a bridge to the introduction of eurobonds. That would make the level playing field permanent.That leaves the second objective: an effective growth policy aiming at nominal growth of up to 5 percent. That is needed to enable the heavily indebted countries to meet the requirements of the Fiscal Compact without falling into a deflationary debt trap. There is no way this objective can be achieved as long as Germany abides by the Bundesbank’s asymmetric interpretation of monetary stability. Germany would have to accept inflation in excess of 2 percent for a limited period of time if it wants to stay in the euro without destroying the European Union.
Marai, un artículo publicado en un medio anglo hasta las cachas, que aboga por la desaparición del euro, o en su defecto inflacionar a cascoporro para que no funcione como moneda reserva, y así no tener nosotros el control de la impresora de billetes, a mi me da que es un grito desesperado. October is coming.....
Si Xoshe, estamos de acuerdo en la unión política. Pero el detalle vuelve a estar en lo de la inflación. Una moneda con una fuerte inflación no es moneda reserva. Y eso les vuelve locos al otro lado del Atlántico -y me temo que más locos aun al otro lado del Canal-.
El euro fue diseñado para tener un valor en el entorno de 1 euro = 1 dólar. En los últimos años el euro vale netamente por encima del dolar, si eso es una moneda débil, un experimento, un fracaso, etc., a mí que me lo expliquen.También el dólar fue "creado" en 1792 para unificar las diversas monedas de empleo legal en distintos estados de la unión. Que por cierto, se tomó como referencia del dólar el real de a 8 español, que a su vez también fue la referencia del dólar canadiense o del yuang. Que entonces aún éramos un imperio.Lo interesante es que las instituciones monetarias estadounidenses no alcanzan su madurez hasta principios del siglo XX, y en todo ese tiempo el dólar vivió momentos felices y otros no tanto, como es lógico.El camino recorrido por el euro en unas pocas décadas equivale al recorrido por el dólar en más de un siglo. Nada de fracaso, es todo un éxito, por eso los USA están tan preocupados por desprestigiarlo porque se ha convertido ya en la segunda moneda de reserva.Saludos.
Un punto de partido sería unificar las embajadas (con el ahorro de costes que ello supondría) donde cada país pusiese un representante o más y según los lazos de unión con esos países podría llevar el peso tal o cual país. Por ejemplo en Angola el peso lo podría lleva Portugal, en Sudáfrica los alemanes u holandeses y en latinoamérica España. Vaya, estoy divagando algo...
Cita de: johnnyburbuja en Septiembre 10, 2012, 17:28:34 pmEl euro fue diseñado para tener un valor en el entorno de 1 euro = 1 dólar. En los últimos años el euro vale netamente por encima del dolar, si eso es una moneda débil, un experimento, un fracaso, etc., a mí que me lo expliquen.También el dólar fue "creado" en 1792 para unificar las diversas monedas de empleo legal en distintos estados de la unión. Que por cierto, se tomó como referencia del dólar el real de a 8 español, que a su vez también fue la referencia del dólar canadiense o del yuang. Que entonces aún éramos un imperio.Lo interesante es que las instituciones monetarias estadounidenses no alcanzan su madurez hasta principios del siglo XX, y en todo ese tiempo el dólar vivió momentos felices y otros no tanto, como es lógico.El camino recorrido por el euro en unas pocas décadas equivale al recorrido por el dólar en más de un siglo. Nada de fracaso, es todo un éxito, por eso los USA están tan preocupados por desprestigiarlo porque se ha convertido ya en la segunda moneda de reserva.Saludos.Así que tu consideras que el euro es todo un éxito. Que el Altísimo te conserve la vista...
Lo que está sucediendo es que nos están sometiendo a un proceso de *saqueo* CALCADO, a los procesos neoliberales que practicaron con latinoamérica con la excusa de la "crisis de la deuda" desde los 70, 80 y 90