Aspectos monetarios y financieros

[saturno]

(Me he permitido citar traducida la excelente aclaración de LH84 en este foro)

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de numeros magicos, al minuto 18' en usa

http://www.ivoox.com/pib-espana-no-es-el-audios-mp3_rf_8462196_1.html

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

El carácter dual del Dinero como (posible) origen de la revolución del pensamiento en la Edad Axial

To connect this impulse, too, with the invention of coinage might seem like pushing things a bit far but, at least for the Classical world, there is an emerging scholarly literature—first set on by Harvard literary theorist Marc Shell, and more recently set forth by British classicist Richard Seaford in a book called Money and the Early Greek Mind—that aims to do exactly that.

In fact, some of the historical connections are so uncannily close that they are very hard to explain any other way. Let me give an example. After the first coins were minted around 600 bc in the kingdom of Lydia, the practice quickly spread to Ionia, the Greek cities of the adjacent coast. The greatest of these was the great walled metropolis of Miletus, which also appears to have been the first Greek city to strike its own coins. It was Ionia, too, that provided the bulk of the Greek mercenaries active in the Mediterranean at the time, with Miletus their effective headquarters. Miletus was also the commercial center of the region, and, perhaps, the first city in the world where everyday market transactions came to be carried out primarily in coins instead of credit.71 Greek philosophy, in turn, begins with three men: Thales, of Miletus (c. 624 bc–c. 546 bc), Anaximander, of Miletus (c. 610 bc–c. 546 bc), and Anaximenes, of Miletus (c. 585 bc–c. 525 bc)—in other words, men who were living in that city at exactly the time that coinage was first introduced.72 All three are remembered chiefly for their speculations on the nature of the physical substance from which the world ultimately sprang. Thales proposed water, Anaximenes, air. Anaximander made up a new term, apeiron, “the unlimited,” a kind of pure abstract substance that could not itself be perceived but was the material basis of everything that could be. In each case, the assumption was that this primal substance, by being heated, cooled, combined, divided, compressed, extended, or set in motion, cooled, combined, divided, compressed, extended, or set in motion, gave rise to the endless particular stutus and substances that humans actually encounter in the world, from which physical objects are composed—and was also that into which all those forms would eventually dissolve.

It was something that could turn into everything. As Seaford emphasizes, so was money. Gold, shaped into coins, is a material substance that is also an abstraction. It is both a lump of metal and something more than a lump of metal—it’s a drachma or an obol, a unit of currency which (at least if collected insufficient quantity, taken to the right place at the right time, turned over to the right person) could be exchanged for absolutely any other object whatsoever.

For Seaford, what was genuinely new about coins was their double-sidedness: the fact that they were both valuable pieces of metal and, at the same time, something more. At least within the communities that created them, ancient coins were always worth more than the gold, silver, or copper of which they were composed.

Seaford refers to this extra value by the inelegant term “fiduciarity,” which comes from the term for public trust, the confidence a community places in its currency. True, at the height of Classical Greece, when there were hundreds of city-states producing different currencies according to a number of different systems of weights and denominations, merchants often did carry scales and treat coins —particularly foreign coins—like so many chunks of silver, just as Indian merchants seem to have treated Roman coins; but within a city, that city’s currency had a special status, since it was always acceptable at face value when used to pay taxes, public fees, or legal penalties. This is, incidentally, why ancient governments were so often able to introduce base metal into their coins without leading to immediate inflation; a debased coin might have lost value when traded overseas, but at home, it was still worth just as much when purchasing a license, or entering the public theater.

This is also why, during publc emergencies, Greek city-states would occasionally strike coins made entirely of bronze or tin, whicheveryone would agree, while the emergency lasted, to treat as if they were really made of silver.

This is the key to Seaford’s argument about materialism and Greek philosophy. A coin was a piece of metal, but by giving it a particular shape, stamped with words and images, the civic community agreed to make it something more. But this power was not unlimited. Bronze coins could not be used forever; if one debased the coinage, inflation would eventually set in. It was as if there was a tension there, between the will of the community and the physical nature of the object itself. Greek thinkers were suddenly confronted with a profoundly new type of object, one of extraordinary importance—as evidenced by the fact that so many men were willing to risk their lives to get their hands on it—but whose nature was a profound enigma.

Consider this word, “materialism.” What does it mean to adopt a “materialist” philosophy? What is “material,” anyway? Normally, e speak of “materials” when we refer to objects that we wish to make into something else. A tree is a living thing. It only becomes “wood” when we begin to think about all the other things you could carve out of it. And of course you can carve a piece of wood into almost anything. The same is true of clay, or glass, or metal.

They’re solid and real and tangible, but also abstractions, because they have the potential to turn into almost anything else—or, not precisely that; one can’t turn a piece of wood into a lion or an owl, but one can turn it into an image of a lion or an owl—it can take on almost any conceivable form. So already in any materialist philosophy, we are dealing with an opposition between form and content, substance and shape; a clash between the idea, sign, emblem, or model in the creator’s mind, and the physical qualities of the materials on which it is to be stamped, built, or imposed, from which it will be brought into reality.77 With coins this rises to an even more abstract level because that emblem can no longer be conceived as the model in one person’s head, but is rather the mark of a collective agreement. The images stamped on Greek coins (Miletus’ lion, Athens’ owl) were typically the emblems of the city’s god, but they were also a kind of collective promise, by which citizens assured one another that not only would the coin be acceptable in payment of public debts, but in a larger sense, that everyone would accept them, for any debts, and thus, that they could be use to acquire anything anyone wanted.

The problem is that this collective power is not unlimited. It only really applies within the city. The farther you go outside, into places dominated by violence, slavery, and war—the sort of place where even philosophers taking a cruise might end up on the auction block—the more it turns into a mere lump of precious metal.

The war between Spirit and Flesh, then, between the noble Idea and ugly Reality, the rational intellect versus stubborn corporeal drives and desires that resist it, even the idea that peace and community are not things that emerge spontaneously but that need to be stamped onto our baser material natures like a divine insignia stamped into base metal—all those ideas that came to haunt the religious and philosophical traditions of the Axial Age, and that have continued to surprise people like Boesoou ever since—can already be seen as inscribed in the nature of this new form of money.

It would be foolish to argue that all Axial Age philosophy was simply a meditation on the nature of coinage, but I think Seaford is right to argue that this is a critical starting place: one of the reasons that the pre-Socratic philosophers began to frame their questions in the peculiar way they did, asking (for instance): What are Ideas? Are they merely collective conventions? Do they exist, as Plato insisted, in some divine domain beyond material existence? Or do they exist in our minds? Or do our minds themselves ultimately partake of that divine immaterial domain? And if they do, what does this say about our relation to our bodies?

https://libcom.org/files/__Debt__The_First_5_000_Years.pdf

Pgs 244 y ss.

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Investigación sobre la posible manipulación de los precios del oro

Swiss watchdog opens bank probe into precious metal collusion
By Joshua Franklin

ZURICH (Reuters) - The Swiss competition regulator has opened an investigation into possible collusion in the precious metals market by several major banks, it said on Monday, the latest in a string of manipulation probes.

Switzerland's WEKO watchdog said its investigation, the result of a preliminary probe, was looking at whether UBS (UBSG.VX), Julius Baer (BAER.VX), Deutsche Bank (DBKGn.DE), HSBC (HSBA.L), Barclays (BARC.L), Morgan Stanley (MS.N) and Mitsui conspired to set bid/ask spreads.

"It (WEKO) has indications that possible prohibited competitive agreements in the trading of precious metals were agreed among the banks mentioned," WEKO said in a statement.

A WEKO spokesman said the investigation would likely conclude in either 2016 or 2017, adding that the banks were suspected of violating Swiss corporate rules.

The banks face financial penalties if WEKO finds them guilty of wrongdoing, the spokesman said. He declined to comment on the size of any possible penalty from the probe.

The WEKO investigation is the latest in a long line of probes into manipulation of the precious metals and foreign exchange markets.

Last year, Switzerland's financial regulator FINMA said it had found a "clear attempt" to manipulate precious metals price benchmarks during a cross-market investigation into trading at UBS.

As part of ongoing obligations imposed by FINMA, UBS is seeking to automate at least 95 percent of its global foreign exchange and precious metals trading by the end of 2016.

In May, four major banks pleaded guilty to trying to manipulate foreign exchange rates and, with two others, were fined nearly $6 billion in another settlement in a global investigation into the $5 trillion-a-day market.

A Julius Baer spokesman said the bank was cooperating with authorities.

In a statement, Deutsche Bank said it was cooperating with requests for information from "certain regulatory authorities" over precious metal benchmarks but declined to comment further.

Representatives for UBS, Barclays, Morgan Stanley and HSBC declined to comment. Mitsui was not immediately available for comment.

(Additional reporting by Kathrin Jones in Frankfurt and by Jan Harvey, Steve Slater and Clara Denina in London; Editing by Miral Fahmy and Dale Hudson)
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/swiss-watchdog-opens-bank-probe-084209628.html

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¿'Armageddon' a la vista? La liquidez de la deuda de EEUU se hunde un 70% desde 2008
Tras años mecida por la mano de los bancos centrales, la renta fija sigue reuniendo motivos para convertirse en un auténtico polvorín en un futuro no tan lejano. Los riesgos, desde luego, acechan.
http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2015-09-28/armageddon-a-la-vista-la-liquidez-de-la-deuda-de-eeuu-se-hunde-un-70-desde-2008_1037075/

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

What will, however, is that unlike previous gold probe cases, this one will actually have consequences.

How do we know?

Because just like in LIBOR-gate, just like in FX-gate, it is the biggest rat of all, Swiss megabank UBS, that is about to turn on its former criminal peers.

As Bloomberg reported earlier "UBS was granted conditional leniency in Swiss antitrust probe of possible manipulation of precious metal prices, a person with knowledge of the matter said."

Bloomberg adds that the "bank may face lower fine than six other banks and financial firms suspected in probe or may avoid penalty altogether, person says."

Why would UBS do this? The same reason UBS did so on at least on two prior occasions: the regulators have definitive proof it is involved, and gave it the option to turn evidence and to rat out its cartel peers, or face even more massive financial penalties.

UBS promptly chose the former, and took the opportunity to minimize yet another key civil (and criminal) market manipulation charge against it, especially after it was already branded a "criminal recidivist" between Libor, FX and, of course, the tax evasion scandal: one more manipulation scandal and the bank could well lose its license to operate in NYC.

Which simply means that now the official countdown on the announcement of what will be revealed as the biggest gold-manipulation and rigging scandal in history, has begun.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-09-28/ubs-about-blow-cover-massive-gold-price-rigging-scandal

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

NEW HAVEN – Increasingly reliant on each other for sustainable economic growth, the United States and China have fallen into a classic codependency trap, bristling at changes in the rules of engagement. The symptoms of this insidious pathology were on clear display during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to America. Little was accomplished, and the path ahead remains treacherous.

Codependency between America and China was born in the late 1970s, when the US was in the grips of wrenching stagflation, and the Chinese economy was in shambles following the Cultural Revolution. Both countries needed new recipes for revival and growth, and turned to each other in a marriage of convenience. China provided cheap goods that enabled income-constrained American consumers to make ends meet, and the US provided the external demand that underpinned Deng Xiaoping’s export-led growth strategy.

Over the years, this arrangement morphed into a deeper relationship. Lacking in saving and wanting to grow, the US relied increasingly on China’s vast reservoir of surplus saving to make ends meet. Anchoring its currency to the dollar, the Chinese built up a huge stake in US Treasuries, which helped America fund record budget deficits.

America provided China with both stability and growth anchors. China enabled the US to sidestep the mounting perils of subpar saving, reckless fiscal policy, and weak household income growth.
But economic codependency is as unstable as human codependency. One partner eventually changes, while the other is left hanging, feeling scorned.

China is now changing, and America doesn’t like it. Not only is China rebalancing its economic model from exports to consumption; it is also redefining its national character. It has adapted a more muscular foreign policy in the South China Sea, embraced the nationalistic longing of rejuvenation, framed by what Xi calls the “China Dream.” And it has started to reshape the international financial architecture with new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and the Silk Road Fund.

The US response has put China on edge, particularly America’s so-called “Asian pivot,” or “strategic rebalancing,” with its subtext of containing China. The US recognizes the need to increase China’s role in the existing Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank); but when it fails to deliver, it chafes at Chinese institution building. And while the US has long urged China to tilt its growth model toward private consumption, it is uncomfortable with many of the implications of this shift.

In large part, America’s unease reflects a failure to address its core economic problems – mainly a lack of domestic saving. The net national saving rate (businesses, households, and the government combined) stood at just 2.9% of national income in mid-2015, less than half the 6.3% average over the final three decades of the twentieth century. As China shifts from surplus saving to saving absorption – using its surpluses to build a safety net for the Chinese people rather than subsidize the savings of Americans – a saving-short US will find it tough to fill the void.

America’s monetary policy reveals another layer of codependency. By citing international concerns – especially China’s slowing growth – as a major reason for deferring its long-awaited interest-rate hike in September, the Federal Reserve has left little doubt concerning the key role that China plays in sustaining a still-fragile US recovery.

And with good reason: US exports, which accounted for a record 13.7% of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2013, up from 10.6% in the first quarter of 2009, slipped back to 12.7% of GDP in mid-2015. With domestic demand still weak – real consumption has grown at an anemic 1.4% pace over the past 7.5 years – the US needs export growth more than ever. So the outlook for China, America’s third-largest and most rapidly growing major export market, is crucial for a Fed that has failed to gain much traction from its unconventional post-crisis monetary policies.

This aspect of codependency is global in scope. Over the past decade, China has accounted for an average of 1.6 percentage points of world GDP growth per year – more than double the combined 0.7-percentage-point contribution of the so-called advanced economies. Even if its GDP growth slows to 6.8% this year, China would account for slightly more growth than is likely from the advanced world. Little wonder that China’s growth prospects are such a big deal for policymakers worldwide.

Speaking in Seattle on September 22, Xi stressed the need for both the US and China to deepen their “mutual understanding of strategic intentions” as a key objective for the bilateral relationship. And yet his deliberations with US President Barack Obama were lacking in precisely that respect. The agenda was shaped more by disconnected issues – cyber security, climate change, and market access – rather than by an appreciation of the strategic challenges that both countries face alone and together.

Moreover, there was little sign of meaningful progress even on the issues that Xi and Obama discussed. Both sides hailed a newfound commitment to high-level exchanges on cyber crime; but the US is about to impose sanctions on Chinese companies that have benefited from egregious hacking. Likewise, they stressed yet again the need for a “high standard” bilateral investment treaty; but there was little indication of serious movement on the industries that would be shielded from such an agreement (the “negative list.”). To its credit, China did announce an important shift in environmental policy – a nationwide cap-and-trade system for greenhouse-gas emissions, to go into effect in 2017. But, without similar actions by the US, China’s move hardly tempers the perils of global climate change.

Trapped in a web of codependency, the US-China relationship has become fraught with friction and finger pointing. In human behavior, the endgame of this pathology is usually a painful breakup. The just-concluded summit between Obama and Xi did little to dispel this possibility.

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/sino-american-codependent-relationship-by-stephen-s--roach-2015-09

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

En los dos 'post' anteriores (“Por qué la devaluación de China es un cambio de paradigma global” y “El final de Chimérica”), relataba cómo el movimiento ejecutado por sorpresa por las autoridades chinas en agosto era un cambio de paradigma global. Una alteración de muchos de los equilibrios que han fundado el gran crecimiento económico mundial de, como mínimo, los últimos 10 años, en especial el de los países emergentes, con China a la cabeza. Niall Ferguson y Moritz Schularick acuñaron el término 'Chimérica' para ilustrar esta simbiosisque era, según ambos, muy potente pero totalmente inestable.

Básicamente porque se basa en que los consumidores norteamericanos mantenían ritmos altísimos de consumo, superiores a lo que les permitía su propia capacidad financiera, con lo que han necesitado financiarlo con deuda. Estados Unidos, con altos déficits comerciales, de gasto público y en especial de su balanza por cuenta corriente, veía cómo China y Japón, con elevadas tasas de ahorro, y también los países exportadores de petróleo y gas le financiaban sus continuos déficits.

Europa y Japón, por otro lado, han quedado fuera de este pacto tácito entre las dos economías líderes y probablemente esto explicaría una parte del menor crecimiento económico. Es cierto que Europa y Japón han aprovechado el 'boom' económico asiático, con China a la cabeza, para ser exportadores netos, a diferencia de los EEUU, pero probablemente este aumento de PIB aportado por su sector exterior no ha compensado otros aspectos negativos, como la pérdida de competitividad por la apreciación de sus monedas versus el dúo dólar-renmimbi.

La debilidad del dólar y, por tanto, de la moneda china fijada al billete verde, derivada de la simbiosis relatada, podría haber terminado en dos fechas concretas, cuando el Gobierno de Shinzo Abe empieza a aplicar su 'Abenomics' y provoca deliberadamente el hundimiento de la moneda nipona en 2012 tras mas de 30 años revalorizándose. La segunda fecha clave es más reciente, verano de 2014 cuando los inversores ven el final de los continuados QE de la Fed y del posible inicio del QE en la Eurozona aplicado por el BCE. Ante esta perspectiva, el euro-dólar pasa en pocos meses de los 1,35 hasta los 1,05 a 1,15 actuales.

La fuerte revalorización del dólar contra la práctica totalidad de las monedas mundiales, junto a las fuertes depreciaciones de algunas de la divisas de las mayores economías del mundo (Rusia, Brasil, Turquía, Indonesia, Japón o incluso Australia), sumidas en una ya declarada “guerra de divisas”, presionan a China para actuar y depreciar su moneda. El obstáculo en su caso era que la simbiosis con EEUU afectaba a algo más que a sus divisas. A pesar del riesgo, China decide por sorpresa anunciar una leve depreciación de su moneda, lo que todo el mundo interpreta como el inicio del fin de esta relación de interés mutuo.

Este inicio de la ruptura del pacto tácito EEUU-China ha provocado, de momento, mucho nerviosismo entre los inversores de los mercados financieros, en los gobiernos y, en especial, entre los banqueros centrales. De hecho, como explicaba, probablemente el movimiento chino tenía por objeto, entre otros, evitar las previstas alzas de tipos de la Fed que indirectamente volverían a presionar al alza a su moneda. Como mínimo su objetivo era retrasarlas o bien reducirlas.

Tras la reciente reunión de la Fed de dos semanas atrás, sus miembros ceden y reconocen que en este nuevo entorno de incertidumbre prefieren, de momento, no subir los tipos de interés. Tanto Draghi como Yellen entienden que la alta volatilidad en los mercados tras el paso chino cambiaba parcialmente el entorno económico y financiero. Draghi y otros miembros del BCE ya insinúan un aumento de la cifra del QE anunciado a principios de 2015. De hecho, según calculaba Goldman Sachs, la tensión en las condiciones financieras provocadas por China equivalía de facto a dos alzas de tipos de la Fed.

China suele ser objeto de críticas, muchas veces injustas por ser realizadas desde un punto de vista occidental. Lo cierto es que la gestión del país en términos políticos, económicos y sociales, en mi opinión, es un ejemplo para el planeta. Unos 500 millones de personas han salido de la pobreza en solo 15 años en Asia, la mayoría en China. Es cierto también que su visión controladora de la economía no funciona muchas veces con las bolsas y mercados. Ha cometido algunos errores recientes sin duda como este.

China de momento ha conseguido su primer objetivo, pero a cambio de sufrir un enorme nerviosismo en sus bolsas y de ver cómo los movimientos de caídas de las monedas de sus principales socios comerciales (Brasil, Canadá, Rusia, Australia, Nueva Zelanda, Chile o Perú) se aceleraban a la baja, con lo que su situación en el mercado de divisas es aún peor que en agosto, cuando inició su pequeña devaluación. Esta reacción presionará a nuevas devaluaciones futuras de la divisa china.

¿Cuáles son los perjudicados y beneficiados de las más que probables nuevas devaluaciones de la moneda china en los próximos meses?

- Países perjudicados: por orden de dependencia de su economía con China serían, en primer lugar, Australia, cuya economía tras 26 años consecutivos con crecimiento económico podría acabar en este segundo trimestre con un crecimiento estimado de -0,1%; Nueva Zelanda, Canadá, Chile, Brasil, Perú y la India serían las siguientes economías más ligadas a China. No hay que ser un premio Nobel para observar que prácticamente todos estos países son exportadores de materias primas.Matemáticamente, los movimientos de la economía australiana se explican en un 85% por las variaciones de la china (ver aquí el cuadro de dependencia de China por países). Para estas economías, una menor exportación supondrá un menor crecimiento y, en consecuencia, una mayor debilidad de su divisas. Los países de la OPEP están sufriendo en sus carnes que su gasto publico ha crecido sin parar, y con el descenso en sus ingresos por venta de petróleo están aumentando sus déficits. Incluso Arabia Saudí, se estima, tendrá una déficit publico en 2015 cercano al -10%. Esto explica que la semana pasada, SAMA, su fondo soberano, ordenara la venta de una parte de su cartera de bolsa en manos de varias gestoras anglosajonas para cubrir su gran déficit.

- Continentes perjudicados: África será a corto plazo uno de los grandes perdedores. Un ejemplo es la crisis en Glencore Plc, la compañía minera británica. Unas semanas atrás anunció una ampliación de capital, venta de activos y reducción de costes. Anunció que cerraba dos de sus mayores minas de cobre, una en el Congo y la otra en Zambia, cuyos ingresos públicos dependen en un 80% de los impuestos a compañías mineras. También Latinoamérica sufrirá: Brasil por la exportación de hierro (no por las exportaciones agrícolas, que continuarán), Chile por el cobre, Peru por las 'commodities' y Venezuela por el petróleo.

- Activos perjudicados: obviamente las materias primas industriales son las mas perjudicadas. China supone en estos últimos años entre el 40 y el 50% del consumo mundial de cemento, mineral de hierro, plomo, zinc, acero o cobre. Aunque el porcentaje de consumo de petróleo es mucho menor, ya que el uso de coches es muy inferior a la media occidental, sin duda el parón chino ha frenado la demanda de crudo. Los precios bajos de petróleo parece que van a durar años. La oferta ha bajado muy poco, ya que el descenso de la producción EEUU no es aún muy grande y se compensa con el aumento en Arabia Saudí, que parece continuar con su estrategia de expulsar a los competidores con mayor coste.

- Países beneficiados: prácticamente todo el mundo se verá perjudicado si continúa la devaluación china y su economía crece menos, pero es cierto que los grandes beneficiados son las países más importadores de petróleo. En Europa, España, Italia, Lituania, Portugal y Grecia ya se están beneficiando de una menor factura energética. En el continente asiático, es curioso que China es un gran beneficiado, seguido de Japón, India y Corea del Sur.

También China supone el 46% del consumo de cerdos global, aunque en este caso es distinto, ya que el 100% es producción interna. Los activos agrícolas no se verán probablemente afectados. Pueden dejar de construir viviendas o aeropuertos pero no cambiarán los hábitos alimenticios. De hecho, en medio de esta tormenta, con datos de julio, China superó el récord histórico de importaciones de soja

http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/el-abrazo-del-koala/2015-09-30/el-final-de-chimerica-repercusiones-beneficiados-y-perjudicados_1042294/

Otros enlaces de interés:

http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/el-abrazo-del-koala/2014-12-03/a-quien-beneficia-y-perjudica-el-desplome-del-petroleo_527159/

http://investorsconundrum.com/2013/04/15/ranking-de-dependencia-economica-de-china-por-paises/

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http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-10-01/there-are-five-times-more-claims-dollars-dollars-existence-why-matters

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11869701/Jeremy-Corbyns-QE-for-the-people-is-exactly-what-the-world-may-soon-need.html

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Andy & Lucas School of Economics

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

Yo no creo que sea una gran solución, pero al menos es una idea audaz, Keen la mencionó en 2012 en el Manifiesto:

http://revistaeconomiacritica.org/sites/default/files/revistas/n14/Intervenciones-1.-steve-keen.pdf

Aunque suena a inflacionismo puro y duro - y sería verdaderamente inflacionaria en el sentido IPCiano del término - lo importante es que solo podría gastarse ese dinero gente que tuviese las deudas a 0 - primero estarías obligado a limpiarte las deudas.

Es decir, la verdadera intención no es la de regalar dinero, sino una versión moderna del Jubileo de Deuda - una forma de Impaguismo.

No me gusta por ser Riesgo Moral Total Final, pero tiene algunas ventajas, sería "universal y simétrico" en lugar de "direccional y privilegiante" como ahora, y sería un solo manguerazo "una y no más, Santo Tomás"

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Todo ese dinero iría "a pie de calle". El dinero se gastaría todo: quien no tiene deuda lo gastaría directamente, quien tiene deuda lo usaría (¿estamos seguros?) en cancelar la deuda pero su ex-acreedor lo gastaría. Se generaría bastante inflación que supondría un robo camuflado a quienes tengan dinero ahorrado. Esa inflación se mantendría en el tiempo en una época en que los salarios y mini-salarios (cuando existen, por el alto nivel de hoagrdesempleo) por lo que disminuiría aún más el poder adquisitivo de los hogares.

Aunque suena a inflacionismo puro y duro, resulta ser inflacionismo puro y duro.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

G-30

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-10-11/g-30-group-central-bankers-warn-they-can-no-longer-save-world

Central banks alone cannot be relied upon to deliver all the policies necessary to achieve macroeconomic goals. Governments must also act and use the policy-making space provided by conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures. Failure to do so would be a serious error and would risk setting the stage for further economic disturbances and imbalances in the future.

(...)


Central bank policies since the outbreak of the crisis have made a crucial contribution to restoring the appearance of financial stability.
 
Nevertheless, for this appearance to become a reality, underlying problems rooted in very high debt levels must be resolved if global growth is to be more sustainably restored.

https://www.scribd.com/doc/284441247/G30-Central-Banking