PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Otoño 2023

[Negrule]

Además, actor imprescindible, en la sombra o no, para que se haya llegado a esta situación, por lo tanto cómplice.

['Cauchemar' significa pesadilla:

Hebdo 30 novembre - 6 décembre

Ciertamente, el capitalismo ha fracasado.]

[asustadísimos]

[El capitalismo ha fracasado en la provisión de vivienda y Ucrania, tan confiada en el capitalismo, perdón, en Occidente, está perdiendo las tres guerras militar-industrial, militar-electrónica y de drones, y militar-poblacional.

Por otra parte, qué parecido hay entre Argentina-2023 y Ucrania-2014, entre Milei y Zelensky, entre el Euromaidán y el Dólar-me-darán.

Van a coincidir:
• la deshonra de los hazmerreíres ucraniano y argentino;
• la humillación definitiva las fantasías animadas de ayer y hoy popularcapitalistas; y
• el anuncio del nuevo modelo de capitalismo planificado.

Zelensky y Milei pertenecen al mismo residuo podrido del modelo muerto, junto con la frutera, la incomodahombres, etcétera.]


[¡Otro –60% a la vista! El Banco Santander recorta el precio objetivo de Aedas, una inmobiliaria que cotizaba cuando salió, en 2017, por encima de 30 y ya andaba por la mitad. Añadan ahora el recorte.]


[No tiene nada que ver, pero qué gracia que pongan Catacrack a un vino de uva bobal:

Bobo: Tonto, estúpido, necio, lelo, memo, simple, zopenco, ceporro, cojudo, dundo, menso, abombado, candoroso, cándido, ingenuo, inocente, simple, pazguato, berengo, papanatas, simplón, bobalicón ]

[Negrule]

Mira que son directos los mensajes para las reuniones familiares navideñas:

Los pisos nuevos sufren la mayor subida de precio en 16 años

La vivienda encadena 38 trimestres de subidas de precios

https://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20231205/9427895/precio-pisos-nuevos-dispara-11-mayor-aumento-16-anos.html

El precio de la vivienda sigue al alza, un 4,5% en el tercer trimestre, impulsado por la obra nueva

Los pisos nuevos se encarecieron un 11% interanual, la tasa más alta de los últimos 16 años

https://cincodias.elpais.com/economia/2023-12-05/el-precio-de-la-vivienda-sigue-al-alza-un-45-en-el-tercer-trimestre-impulsado-por-la-obra-nueva.html


El euríbor pliega velas y ya abarataría las hipotecas con revisión semestral

El índice baja del 3,8% en tasa diaria y apunta a una media en diciembre sensiblemente menor a la de hace seis meses.

https://cincodias.elpais.com/mercados-financieros/2023-12-04/el-euribor-pliega-velas-y-ya-abarataria-las-hipotecas-con-revision-semestral.html

[Benzino Napaloni]

Mira que son directos los mensajes para las reuniones familiares navideñas:

Los pisos nuevos sufren la mayor subida de precio en 16 años

La vivienda encadena 38 trimestres de subidas de precios

https://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20231205/9427895/precio-pisos-nuevos-dispara-11-mayor-aumento-16-anos.html

El precio de la vivienda sigue al alza, un 4,5% en el tercer trimestre, impulsado por la obra nueva

Los pisos nuevos se encarecieron un 11% interanual, la tasa más alta de los últimos 16 años

https://cincodias.elpais.com/economia/2023-12-05/el-precio-de-la-vivienda-sigue-al-alza-un-45-en-el-tercer-trimestre-impulsado-por-la-obra-nueva.html


El euríbor pliega velas y ya abarataría las hipotecas con revisión semestral

El índice baja del 3,8% en tasa diaria y apunta a una media en diciembre sensiblemente menor a la de hace seis meses.

https://cincodias.elpais.com/mercados-financieros/2023-12-04/el-euribor-pliega-velas-y-ya-abarataria-las-hipotecas-con-revision-semestral.html

"Falta oferta": suben los hactibos y los mercaos.
Se construye obra nueva: suben los activos y los mercaos.
El euribor cede algo y artificialmente con los tipos sin bajar: suben los activos y los mercaos.

 

La última vez también había burlas con "han bajado los pisos ya". Vaya si bajaron. Apropiándome de una burla que hacían los fachas no hace mucho, "si tenemos que volver a pasar pasaremos".


Sé que el tema quema, y que hierve la sangre al ver estas guarradas. Pero el grifo de la financiación hace tiempo que se cerró, esto no es más que el arreón final y el intento final desesperado por demostrar "quién manda".

Ahora vienen las navidades, ya veremos cómo viene la cuesta de enero.

[saturno]

Entrevisa  v/FR Cécile Duflot (OXFAM y ex-ministra de vivienda)-  entrevista France Inter del 7/10
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-IUjeKfTjY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-IUjeKfTjY

PPCCiana a 80%
- La vivienda es un bien fundamental - mercado cautivo
- financiarización (fiscalidad) que concentra en 3,5% el 50% del parque de alquiler
- los Chalecos amarillos no es el precio del gasoil, sino la distancia -- es decir el precio de la vivienda
-- AirBNB - reservar a la vvda principal
-- etc

(Editado el post con las referencias de OXFAM)

[Derby]

https://www.vozpopuli.com/economia_y_finanzas/lone-star-caixabank-exprimen-servihabitat-antes-venderla-reparten-30-millones-dividendos.html

SERVIHABITAT ES UNA DE LAS INMOBILIARIAS MÁS INTENSIVAS EN PLANTILLA EN ESPAÑA, CON UNOS 700 EMPLEADOS
Lone Star exprime la gestora de CaixaBank antes de venderla: se reparten 30 millones en dividendos

El accionista mayoritario de Servihabitat se hace con dividendos multimillonarios con cargo al ejercicio 2022, que acabó con un roto de 17,5 millones para la gestora y división con el banco

El futuro de los más de 700 empleados de Servihabitat es una de las grandes incógnitas del sector inmobiliario en España. El mayor propietario de la gestora, el fondo de inversión americano Lone Star (en un 80%, seguido de CaixaBank con un 20%), busca cerrar en las próximas semanas una venta a un inversor capaz de relanzar la compañía tras la pérdida de algunos de sus principales contratos. Entre ellos, el de la gestión de la cartera de Sareb (Sociedad de Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria) y la del propio CaixaBank, que este año apartó a Servihabitat en favor de la sueca Intrum y de la española Azora.

El reacomodamiento de Servihabitat tras un "turbulento" 2023 podría pasar por un ajuste de plantilla, atendiendo a fuentes del sector, aunque desde la compañía se ha optado por no hacer comentarios en esa línea. Por lo pronto, según consta en las últimas cuentas de la empresa, el accionariado liderado por Lone Star no ha dudado en consignar millonarios dividendos pese al creciente déficit operativo, que se saldó con un ajuste de la plantilla media de 857 a 773 personas al cabo del último ejercicio.

Si bien Servihabitat perdió, antes de impuestos, 5,2 millones de euros al cabo del ejercicio 2022, los propietarios decidieron repartirse 20 millones de euros en dividendos con cargo a reservas de ese mismo curso. Ya en el anterior, Coral Homes, la matriz propietaria de Servihabitat que Lone Star controla en un 80% y CaixaBank en un 20%, había decidido la distribución de 10 millones de euros en retribución a los accionistas en un período que acabó con un resultado antes de impuestos de 1,5 millones.

"La Sociedad durante el ejercicio 2022 ha puesto en marcha determinadas acciones orientadas a la contención de los costes generales y al mantenimiento de la solidez financiera priorizando la tesorería y la financiación disponible", comunica la empresa en sus últimas cuentas anuales remitidas al Registro Mercantil. "La sólida posición financiera existente ha permitido a la Sociedad distribuir, en favor de su Socio Único, dividendos con cargo a reservas por importe agregado de 20.000 miles de euros durante el ejercicio 2022".

Unos dividendos que han redundado en beneficio de la sociedad Coral Homes. No obstante, es de notar que los consejeros en Coral que responden a CaixaBank, Francesc Bellavista y Jordi Soldevilla, se han abstenido de respaldar las cuentas de la matriz de Servihabitat en 2022 en el marco de un pleito de más de 300 millones entre Lone Star y el banco que preside José Ignacio Goirigolzarri.

A preguntas de Vozpópuli sobre su posición respecto a los dividendos, desde CaixaBank se han remitido a Coral Homes y Servihabitat, que al cierre de esta edición no había hecho comentarios. Al cabo del ejercicio 2022, la propia Coral Homes controlada en su mayoría por el fondo americano declaraba tener una deuda a corto plazo de 31,5 millones con CaixaBank.

Roto para Servihabitat de 17,5 millones el último año

Lone Star impuso el reparto de dividendos con cargo a las reservas de Servihabitat, que cayeron de 131,3 millones en 2021 a 68,6 millones en 2022. El ratio de solvencia descendió de 1,79 veces en 2021 a 1,56 en 2022, por el 2,99 del sector atendiendo a los registros de la plataforma Insight View. El pasivo corriente, en suma, bajó de 112,3 millones a 89,2 millones.

En el ejercicio 2021, Servihabitat había facturado 238 millones de euros, cerca de un 10% más que al cabo del 2022. Paralelamente, en los últimos dos años, los fondos propios de la compañía cayeron de 89 millones a 52 millones.

Si al cabo del año 2021, el resultado era de 2,1 millones de pérdidas -una vez descontadas las acumuladas de ejercicios anteriores-, al finalizar el 2022 el 'roto' ascendió a 17,5 millones, "principalmente por la finalización del contrato con la SAREB y la reversión de impuestos diferidos por importe de 12.321 miles de euros".

Las últimas cuentas inciden que la compañía no sufragó durante 2022 gasto alguno asociado al plan de incentivos de la Alta Dirección "toda vez que no se han alcanzado los niveles mínimos establecidos contractualmente". En este 2023, Iheb Nafaa dejó el cargo de consejero delegado y fue sucedido por un hombre de Lone Star dentro de la propia Servihabitat, Borja Goday.

De cara a una posible venta, los accionistas ponen de relieve el ebitda de la compañía. El ebitda generado el último año, "entendido como importe de la cifra de negocios menos gastos de personal y otros gastos de explotación, ascendió a 16.014 miles de euros".

Esto último explica la cifra pretendida por los propietarios para un hipotético traspaso, de unos 70 millones. Ante la comparativa con la reciente operación en torno de Haya Real Estate, cuya venta se cerró en una cantidad que no llegó a tres veces el ebitda, fuentes del mercado apuntan a un precio final notablemente inferior. Según informó El Confidencial, la gestora de activos británica Pollen Street se perfila como el único candidato a la compra.

[Derby]

https://www.vozpopuli.com/economia_y_finanzas/renegociaciones-hipotecas-disparan-un-200-y-cerraran-ano-record-2016.html

Las renegociaciones de hipotecas se disparan un 200% y cerrarán el año en récord desde 2016

El coste de cambiar de condiciones escala al 4,72%, máximos históricos, pese a que se suprimió la comisión para pasarse de hipotecas variables a tipo fijo

Los efectos de las subidas de tipos cada vez son más patentes en el mercado hipotecario. Las familias están recurriendo de forma masiva a las renegociaciones de hipotecas para facilitar el pago de las cuotas, que se han disparado un 200% en los diez primeros meses del año, según los últimos datos disponibles del Banco de España. Y eso que el coste para cambiar de condiciones está en niveles no vistos desde que se elaboran estadísticas.

El volumen de renegociaciones alcanza los 3.769 millones de euros entre enero y octubre. Es una cifra que supera a los ejercicios completos desde 2016, por lo que 2023 cerrará en niveles máximos desde entonces.

Con la inflación todavía en niveles altos pese a que desacelera (se situó en el 3,2% en noviembre), las renegociaciones de hipotecas se convierten en una solución recurrente para bajar la cuota, ya sea alargando los plazos de devolución o cambiando la modalidad del préstamo.(...)

[Mad Men]

[El capitalismo ha fracasado en la provisión de vivienda y Ucrania, tan confiada en el capitalismo, perdón, en Occidente, está perdiendo las tres guerras militar-industrial, militar-electrónica y de drones, y militar-poblacional.

Por otra parte, qué parecido hay entre Argentina-2023 y Ucrania-2014, entre Milei y Zelensky, entre el Euromaidán y el Dólar-me-darán.

Van a coincidir:
• la deshonra de los hazmerreíres ucraniano y argentino;
• la humillación definitiva las fantasías animadas de ayer y hoy popularcapitalistas; y
• el anuncio del nuevo modelo de capitalismo planificado.

Zelensky y Milei pertenecen al mismo residuo podrido del modelo muerto, junto con la frutera, la incomodahombres, etcétera.]


[¡Otro –60% a la vista! El Banco Santander recorta el precio objetivo de Aedas, una inmobiliaria que cotizaba cuando salió, en 2017, por encima de 30 y ya andaba por la mitad. Añadan ahora el recorte.]


[No tiene nada que ver, pero qué gracia que pongan Catacrack a un vino de uva bobal:

Bobo: Tonto, estúpido, necio, lelo, memo, simple, zopenco, ceporro, cojudo, dundo, menso, abombado, candoroso, cándido, ingenuo, inocente, simple, pazguato, berengo, papanatas, simplón, bobalicón ]

A ver si lo entiendo. Ucrania debe sumirse a Rusia?. Al pais invasor? Al que ha provocado una guerra con resultados nefastos?

[senslev]

Después de que la OTAN no cumpliera con la palabra de no ponerles pepinos a 100m de la frontera. Supongo que a USA no le gustaría tener en Méjico pepinos made in Rusia. Creo que va bastante más allá de buenos y malos.

[Derby]

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/05/business/china-evergrande-default-debt.html
https://dnyuz.com/2023/12/05/china-evergrandes-crash-was-accelerated-by-questionable-accounting/

China Evergrande’s Crash Was Accelerated by Questionable Accounting

In January, more than 100 financial sleuths were dispatched to the Guangzhou headquarters of China Evergrande Group, a real estate giant that had defaulted a year earlier under $300 billion of debt. Its longtime auditor had just resigned, and a nation of home buyers had directed its ire at Evergrande.

Police on watch for protesters stood guard outside the building, and the new team of auditors were issued permits to get in. After six months of work, the auditors reported that Evergrande had lost $81 billion over the prior two years, vastly more than expected.

But they still had questions. Some records they had requested from Evergrande were incomplete. Numbers were missing. Important accounting errors or misstatements may have gone undetected. How had things at Evergrande — once one of China’s most successful companies — gone so wrong?

China’s housing boom was the biggest the world has seen, and Evergrande’s rise was powered by rapacious expansion, the system that stoked it and foreign investors who threw money at it. When China’s housing bubble burst, no other company imploded in as spectacular a fashion.

In 2021, the blame for Evergrande’s failure was placed squarely on a political directive from Beijing to cool the market by restricting access to loans by property developers, depriving the debt-saddled company of cash to fund its operations.

But interviews with people close to Evergrande and a reconstruction of publicly available documents offer an alternate explanation: Questionable accounting and poor corporate oversight, leading to problems like the disappearance of $2 billion, had already sent the company careening toward catastrophe.

The scale of Evergrande’s rise was staggering. For three decades, it wielded power in Beijing and in cities and towns thousands of miles away. The success turned its founder and chairman, Hui Ka Yan, into one of the world’s wealthiest people and enriched an entire ecosystem — from the local governments that sold it land to the Wall Street banks that charged it fees to raise money.

The breadth of Evergrande’s stumbles was mind-numbing. The company promised hundreds of thousands of home buyers apartments that it never built. It took in billions of dollars from families and employees, some of which has vanished. It took labor from construction workers, painters and real estate agents without compensation, unpaid bills that have snowballed into $140 billion.

Today Evergrande remains in default, unable to pay its debts but not officially defunct. Its stock trades for pennies a share. On Monday, a legal attempt to force its liquidation was prolonged: A judge adjourned a hearing in a lawsuit seeking to formally dismantle the sprawling company to pay back some of the investors who lost money.

Evergrande officials and its representatives did not respond to several requests for interviews or comment.

A housing boom that was overpriced, overbuilt and overleveraged.

China’s housing boom began around the time that Mr. Hui started Evergrande in 1996 in the city of Shenzhen, a special economic zone where the Chinese Communist Party was experimenting with capitalism.

Evergrande expanded beyond Shenzhen as China underwent massive urbanization, and it was central to the world’s largest movement of people from the countryside to cities. Mr. Hui ingratiated himself with the families of some of China’s most senior officials. He put Wen Jiahong, the brother of China’s then vice premier, Wen Jiabao, on Evergrande’s board of directors in 2002.

By the time Evergrande started selling stock to the public in Hong Kong in 2009, it had already faced questions about its voracious expansion. Foreign investors, many of them American private equity funds, hedge funds and Wall Street banks, had shoveled money into real estate companies a few years earlier, and the debt was piling up. Mr. Hui had hoped to raise $1.5 billion, but the company ended up with $722 million from listing its shares.

Around the world, a global financial crisis was reverberating, one that started with a plunge in housing prices in the United States. But in China, after a short and steep downturn, the government pumped $500 billion into building roads and railways, juicing growth and allowing China to emerge from the crisis before other countries. By listing its shares in Hong Kong, Evergrande had access to money outside China to buy land in China. Dozens of other developers were doing the same thing. Three of them — Kaisa Group, Yuzhou Properties and Fantasia Holdings — raised money over the same few weeks as Evergrande. They have all since defaulted.

By 2010, the market was showing signs of overheating. Housing prices were rising faster than the average household income. Soon economists were warning that China’s housing market was overpriced, supply was overbuilt and its developers were overleveraged.

Chinese home buyers continued to flock to construction projects anyway. As cities filled up with new apartment blocks, developers looked farther afield to satellite towns and more rural areas.

Prospective buyers were led through showrooms and model apartments and then handed a piece of paper to sign. For a third of the price of an apartment, and sometimes even more, they bought a promise, an apartment not yet built. For households with few places to store their wealth, it was difficult to imagine how a bet on real estate could go wrong.

But things did go wrong. Over the last decade, the authorities have tried to rein in lending, but real estate companies found ways around each restriction, sometimes cutting corners on apartments, other times moving debts off their balance sheets. Eventually, a policy in 2020 that made it harder to borrow started to tip developers over the precipice.

Estimates range over how many apartments remain empty. He Keng, a former deputy head of China’s statistics bureau, recently quipped about an estimate that the number of vacant homes was not enough for three billion people. “That estimate might be a bit much,” he said in a video published by China News Media. “But 1.4 billion people probably can’t fill them.”

‘The biggest bubble in history.’

For months in 2021, Evergrande kept global markets on edge as it approached default, testing a belief that some Chinese companies were too big for the authorities to let them fail. Foreign investors continued to buy the bonds of real estate developers even after one of the biggest beneficiaries of the housing boom, the real estate mogul Wang Jianlin, warned that China’s housing market was “the biggest bubble in history.”

On Dec. 9, three days after Evergrande missed a deadline to pay interest on some bonds, a credit ratings agency declared the company to be in default. That set in motion a struggle among investors, home buyers, suppliers and banks over how to get what they were owed.

Evergrande’s collapse was just one domino in a falling line. Since then, 46 other developers have defaulted, leaving a landscape of boarded-up construction sites, angry home buyers and unpaid builders. Worried about social unrest, the authorities have quietly pushed for the companies to continue building apartments. Evergrande built 300,000 apartments in 2022 while the company talked to its creditors about repaying them.

But years of poor corporate governance and bad behavior at Evergrande were spilling into the public as it became harder to get financing.

Three months after its default, Evergrande said $2 billion had been seized by banks. An internal investigation later revealed that top executives had engineered a plan in late 2020 to get around borrowing restrictions by arranging for third parties to take out loans using Evergrande subsidiaries as collateral.

The investigation concluded that the plan breached the company’s disclosure and compliance obligations.

Nevertheless, some employees said that “it was not their place to question a matter that was known to and driven by senior executives,” according to the investigation.

Top executives, including the chief financial officer and chief executive officer, resigned. “The behavior of certain then directors fell below the standards expected by the company,” according to the internal report, which was signed by Mr. Hui, the founder.

This January, Evergrande’s longtime auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, resigned and said it couldn’t complete its work. Hong Kong’s Accounting and Financial Reporting Council had already announced two reviews of Evergrande’s books. A little known accounting firm, Prism Hong Kong and Shanghai, was brought in to do the work.

Prism said in July that Evergrande had lost a combined $81 billion in 2021 and 2022. That compared with what the company said in 2020 was a profit of $1 billion. There were clues in the new audit that Evergrande had been treating money it had received for apartments as revenue even though at times it had not yet built those apartments.

After the new audit, Evergrande agreed to change how it would recognize revenue in its accounts by requiring documentation that an apartment had first been built.

Evergrande’s wealth management arm, which had pitched short-term and high-interest products to home buyers and employees when money was tight, told investors in August that it wouldn’t be able to make payments.

Within weeks, the police detained staff at the wealth management unit. The Chinese media reported that the company’s former chief executive, its chief financial officer and the former chairman of Evergrande’s life insurance unit had also been detained.

Behind the scenes, the company’s management team in Hong Kong was making progress toward a restructuring deal with foreign creditors and private lenders. Then, on Sept. 24, Evergrande said it had to reassess and scrapped the deal. A few days later, it disclosed that Mr. Hui had been arrested.

Chinese social media lit up with comments about how Mr. Hui had become “an enemy of the Chinese people.” People turned their anger to foreign investors and a move by the company to file for bankruptcy protection. Celebrity entrepreneurs piled on about foreigners getting a piece of the remaining company that belonged to to home buyers.

According to company filings, Mr. Hui had paid himself and his wife more than $7 billion in dividends since taking the company public in 2009. He has told people for at least two years that he and his wife were divorced, according to two people with direct interactions with the company who were not allowed to speak to the media. Filings in August indicate that he and his wife were no longer married. Assets that have been transferred to his former wife will be in dispute.

Two years after it defaulted, it is still uncertain how the company will be wound down, how much money will be left and who will get it.

[Derby]

https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/moodys-cuts-china-credit-outlook-negative-cites-slowing-105380884

Moody's cuts China credit outlook to negative, cites slowing economic growth, property crisis

Credit rating agency Moody’s has downgraded its outlook for Chinese sovereign bonds to negative, citing risks from a slowing economy and a crisis in its property sector

[Mad Men]

 

Después de que la OTAN no cumpliera con la palabra de no ponerles pepinos a 100m de la frontera. Supongo que a USA no le gustaría tener en Méjico pepinos made in Rusia. Creo que va bastante más allá de buenos y malos.

Ucranina NUNCA ha tenido pepinos de la Otan.

Pero decir que no hay buenos ni malos y que la guerra es la solución está bien parece ser si no es en tu país, con tus conciudadanos,amigos y familia.

[Derby]

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/05/business/china-wanxiang-trust-bank-protests-intl-hnk/index.html

Wanxiang Trust: Another Chinese ‘shadow bank’ faces major financial trouble

Hong Kong CNN — Wanxiang Trust, an investment and asset management company in China, has reportedly missed payments on several investment products to investors, adding to fresh worries about the stability of the country’s shadow banking sector.

The Hangzhou-based firm has delayed payments on a number of maturing products worth several billion yuan — some of which invested in real estate — state-owned 21st Century Business Herald reported on Tuesday, citing unnamed investors. A trust company usually manages funds for individuals, companies or other entities.

China’s trust firms are part of its $3 trillion “shadow banking” industry, which forms an important source of finance in the country. The term usually refers to financing activity that takes place outside the formal banking system, either by banks through off-balance-sheet activities, or by non-bank financial institutions.

Separately, state-owned Cailianshe reported last Friday that Wanxiang also missed interest payments on two other trust products since August, which have a total outstanding value of 1 billion yuan ($141 million).

Dozens of investors who had bought the products, which invested in the medical sector, protested at the financial regulator in the eastern province of Zhejiang last week, voicing their grievances to the supervisor and questioning Wanxiang’s use of their funds, Cailianshe said.

Calls to Wanxiang’s hotline were not answered, and the company hasn’t responded to emailed requests for comments.

Wanxiang Trust was established in 2012 and is owned by Wanxiang Group, one of China’s largest privately-owned conglomerates. By the end of 2022, the trust company managed related assets worth 89.25 billion yuan ($12.6 billion), 58% of which were invested in real estate.

The reports come two weeks after Zhongzhi Enterprise Group, another major shadow bank, declared itself “insolvent” after missing payments to its investors. Zhongzhi is currently at the center of a criminal investigation by police.

The trust industry’s troubles highlight “the property spillover” into the financial sector, Fitch Ratings said in a report last week.

Moody’s Investors Services also warned in September that China’s trust sector could face liquidity challenges during the current property downturn.

China’s trust industry has lent extensively to the country’s property developers, many of which have fallen into trouble since 2020, when the government cracked down on reckless borrowing.

Among Wanxiang’s troubled products, one was linked to embattled property developer Kaisa Group, which defaulted in 2021, according to the 21st Century Business Herald.

Another product invested in a local government financing vehicle in the southwestern province of Guizhou, which has defaulted on some of its loans.

The two medical trust products were related to a hospital project in Guizhou, which is one of China’s most indebted provinces, according to Cailianshe.

Local governments, which have traditionally relied heavily on income from land sales, have taken a hit in their finances from the property downturn. Earlier this year, Guizhou admitted defeat in trying to sort out its finances and appealed to Beijing for help to avert default.

Last month, at its twice-a-decade Central Financial Work Conference, the Chinese leadership stressed the importance of addressing risks more systematically across the financial sector and preserving overall stability.

[Derby]

Elon Musk retwiteando a Milei 

https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1731994231370035671

[senslev]

Nunca he dicho Ucrania, pero cada vez más cerca sí. No se cumplió con la palabra de no expandir la OTAN hacia el este de Europa, pues nada, ahí tienes el resultado. Nunca he dicho que la guerra sea una solución, un poquito de por favor. Más bien ambos malos, el hijoputismo es bilateral sin descartar arreglos bajo manga en los que, efectivamente, el ciudadano importa una mierda.

Después de que la OTAN no cumpliera con la palabra de no ponerles pepinos a 100m de la frontera. Supongo que a USA no le gustaría tener en Méjico pepinos made in Rusia. Creo que va bastante más allá de buenos y malos.

Ucranina NUNCA ha tenido pepinos de la Otan.

Pero decir que no hay buenos ni malos y que la guerra es la solución está bien parece ser si no es en tu país, con tus conciudadanos,amigos y familia.